Comparing two foreign policies:

FHC and Lula in perspective

Selected topics	FHC	Lula
Relations with the United States	Essential, cooperative; sectoral disagreements, most limited to trade issues; �realistic� emphasys on bilateral cooperation; moderate reciprocity	Important, but not deemed essential; large areas of disagreement, both political and economic; political emphasys on multipolarity; strict reciprocity
South America	Strategic relationship, rethorical emphasys but little real initiatives during first mandate; Andean-Mercosur trade pact stalled; Brasilia meeting of heads of State, second mandate (Sept. 2000); physical integration (IIRSA)	Strategic relationship, political initiatives to translate rethorics into reality; bilateral visits to and from all countries; resumed regional trade negotiations (at last a CAN-Mercosur agreement); yes to physical integration
Europe	Historical ties, most important partner, but realistic assumption on trade opening; not viewed as strategic leverage in the relationship with the U.S.	Important partner and a compensating role in the strategic alliance against unilateralism (U.S.); Trade pact Mercosur-EU viewed as more beneficious than the FTAA
Mercosur	One of the top priorities of the Brazilian foreign policy: a possible basis for economic integration into the world and the strengthening of economic relationships in the region; trade and economics first	The top priority of the foreign policy: strategic importance and a basis for the political union of South America, free from outside influences and hegemonic constraints (fortress); social and politics take the lead
Argentina	A strategic partner; political and economic coordination within limits in some grounds; realistic assumptions on Mercosur common currency	The strategic partner; frequent talks on many issues, looking for shared policies (FTAA, f.i); pursuit of a common currency and political union in Mercosur
FTAA	Not very enthusiastic, but no real opposition; could be a real opportunity for the modernization of Brazilian economy; realistic bargaining over sectoral protectionist policies (U.S. farm subsidies) and acceptance of new issues (rules and access)	PT opposed, at first; Lula candidate: �annexation�; Reluctant acceptance in power, and very hard bargain at negotiating table; �compensations� to correct structural asymetries; very limited agreement on new rules in the absence of real market access (farm sector)
Multilateralism, UN Security Council	Realistic multilateralism; reliance on international law but tacit acceptance of the �more equals�; a non-insistant candidate to a UNSC permanent chair	Strong multilateralism; sovereignity and equality of all countries; alliances with other middle powers and emerging economies; UNSC chair: a top priority
Brazil as a �leader�	Saw as result of economic preeminence and limited to the region; awareness of the Brazilian limited strategic and economic capabilities; cooperation with Africa	A main political objective, not only in the region; to be acquired by diplomatic activism; no apparent constraints in �real� factors; solidarity with Africa
Globalization	At first, a new Renaissance; after, limitations due to asymetries and volatility; implicit acceptance of the Washington consensus; yes to Davos, not even accepted in Porto Alegre; economic sustainability	At first, �a new world is possible�: yes to Porto Alegre; a resounding no to Davos; after, realistic dialogue with both worlds; explicit refusal of the Washington consensus; social sustainability
IMF, hot money	Non-ideological approach; cooperative relationship during financial turmoil; accept as long as needed	PT opposed any agreement, at first; reluctant acceptance and silent distrust, after; tolerate only while needed
WTO, multilateral trade negotiations, South-South	Full participation, moderate activism; economic interdependence and openess to FDI; dialogue but not real coordination with the South	Full participation, strong activism; national economic sovereignity and sectoral development policies; strategic alliances (G-20; South Africa and India)
Foreign tools	Itamaraty as main locus; presidential diplomacy; economic priorities; accept the world as it is; perhaps a Tobin tax; dialogue with the G-7 and a OECD-like approach to international agenda	Itamaraty and advisors; presidential diplomacy; political priorities at first; to change the world (Zero Hunger); yes to Tobin tax and other �corrective� instruments; G-8 dialogue and G-15 coordination
Conception and selection of issues: Paulo Roberto de Almeida (21 Feb 2004)